the support of institutions and professional societies, are necessary to deter the suppression of environmental science.
II. THE SCOPE OF SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
The International Society of Environmental Epidemiologists ("ISEE") defines research suppression as obstructing the study or release of scientific findings for reasons other than a concern for scientific validity or objectivity.
11 Brian Martin, who has written extensively on the issue of suppression of environmental scientists, defines suppression as instances where someone or some organization threatens a scientist's employment position, financial support, or ability to publish or communicate research for reasons other than the quality of the work or the qualifications or credentials of the researcher. 12 More specifically, suppression involves efforts to withdraw or withhold research money; transfer scientists to jobs where further unwelcome research is difficult or impossible; deny employment appointments, promotions, or tenure; dismiss scientists from their research positions; and block publications or presentations on the methods and results of research. 13 Thus, suppression of environmental science, as the phrase is used herein, seeks to prevent the creation of certain unwelcome data or theories, or, alternatively, to deter or block the dissemination of unwelcome data or theories that already exist, through pressure or restraints on environmental scientists.
14 Suppression can be contrasted with what Martin has termed "repression," in which extralegal methods, including violence or threats of violence, are used to silence scientists and their work. 15 Recent examples of efforts to suppress environmental science involve government and private sector employers who sought to punish scientists for publicizing their research results or communicating their scientific opinions. In the mid-1990s, David Kern, a physician employed by Brown University and a Rhode Island hospital, noticed a rare lung disease among workers at a flock manufacturing plant that hired him as a consultant. 16 When he prepared an abstract about his findings for a professional conference, the company requested that the abstract not be submitted, arguing that an agreement to protect manufacturing process trade 11 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF Kern changed the abstract to make it difficult to identify the manufacturer and presented the paper, feeling that his professional obligations to seek out information from colleagues that might assist in determining the causes of the disease and to warn others to be on the lookout for the disease outweighed the company's objections. 18 Judging that the risk of litigation by the company over any disclosure was not worth publicly disclosing information about the disease, Kern's hospital and university employer pressured Kern to withdraw the abstract. 19 Ultimately, Kern's employer terminated Kern's consulting relationship with the company, eliminated the occupational health program he directed, and informed him that his five-year employment contract would not be renewed. 20 Omar Shafey, a former epidemiologist with the Florida Department of Health, met a similar fate when he refused to alter a report characterized by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") as "excellent" and "reasonable and appropriate." 21 The report recommended that the state stop its aerial spraying campaign of the pesticide malathion. 22 After Shafey refused to follow the suggestion of a state official that Shafey conform his scientific recommendations to official agency policy or leave, 23 the agency undertook an extensive audit of Shafey's travel records and, upon finding a possible $12.50 overcharge on a travel reimbursement claim and an allegedly inappropriate e-mail to the CDC, fired him. 24 Myron Mehlman, Mobil Oil Corporation's former Director of Toxicology and Manager of its Environmental Health and Science Laboratory, gave a presentation in 1989 to corporate managers in Japan about the health effects of gasoline. 25 Upon learning during the presentation that gasoline sold by Mobil's Japanese subsidiary contained levels of benzene in excess of 5%, Mehlman warned the managers that the concentrations were too high and that the levels had to be reduced or the gasoline should not be sold. 26 Immediately upon his return to the United States, Mobil fired Mehlman, accusing him of misusing company personnel and supplies to promote his wife's scientific publishing business, and subsequently attempted "to orchestrate a 17 523-24 (1997) . 21 Jan Hollingsworth, Warnings Cut from Malathion Report, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 17, 1999, at 1. 22 Id. Shafey, as head of the state's pesticide poisoning surveillance program, documented more than a hundred cases of illness associated with the state's 1998 malathion spraying campaign to eradicate the Mediterranean fruit fly. Jan Hollingsworth, CDC Agrees Malathion Caused Illness, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at 1. Jan Hollingsworth, Health Office Fires Critic, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 18, 2000, at 1. Martin notes that the rhetoric of accountability, through audits or surveillance, is sometimes used to harass a scientist. Suppressing Research Data, supra note 13, at 355. MARTIN, supra note 12, at 30 (suggesting a "double standard test" to determine if the problematic scientist is being treated the same as other employees or instead discriminated against because of unwelcome research or recommendations). 25 Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1002-03 (N.J. 1998). 26 Id. at 1003.
Id
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smear campaign" against him. 27 Mehlman successfully sued Mobil under New Jersey's employee protection act and recovered $7 million in damages. 28 Although they did not go so far as to dismiss the scientist, supervisors of James Zahn, a former researcher at the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service in Ames, Iowa, repeatedly prevented him from publishing or otherwise presenting his findings that air emissions from hog confinements contained antibiotic-resistant bacteria. 29 Zahn's supervisors took the action after a representative of pork producers questioned his scheduled appearance before a local board of health. 30 Scientists for the U.S. Department of Interior report numerous instances of threats or demotions when their scientific opinions differ from the Agency's preferred position. 31 Similarly, a senior member of the Royal Society, the United Kingdom's premier scientific academy, allegedly threatened the editor of The Lancet that he would lose his editorial position if the journal published research questioning the safety of genetically modified foods. 32 Lawsuits, or threats of lawsuits, are another form of harassment. For example, after Dr. Randolph Byers first suggested that some childhood learning problems might be caused by lead toxicity, the Lead Industries Association threatened to sue him for a million dollars. 33 Furthermore, a lawyer for cold fusion proponent Stanley Pons wrote a letter to University of Utah physicist Michael Salamon threatening legal action and demanding retraction of a study reported in Nature magazine that cast doubt on some of Pons' cold fusion claims. 34 Additionally, a retired director of epidemiology for Monsanto filed a $4 million defamation suit in 1991 against the Environmental Research Foundation, a small public interest science organization, after it published a story about a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") memo that raised questions about the epidemiologist's study of workers exposed to dioxin while manufacturing Agent Orange. 35 Also, a company proposing to build a 27 Id. at 1003-04. The jury found that Mobil's purported grounds for Mehlman's termination were pretextual. Id. at 1005. 28 Id. at 1008, 1017. The jury awarded Mehlman over $2.56 million for his financial losses and $875,000 for emotional distress. Id. at 1008. In addition, the jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive damages based upon Mobil's attempted smear campaign and "as a necessary deterrent to prevent Mobil and other companies from silencing their employees when they object to the type of harmful, dangerous conduct by their employers claimed here." Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 676 A.2d 1143, 1162, 1164-65 (N.J. App. 1996). Mehlman described his efforts to restore his reputation and to battle against the smear campaign as "nine years of hell. When the federal government claimed that it could not indemnify the scientists against the lawsuit, the safety analysis stopped.
37
A final set of examples involves public attacks on the personal character and conduct of the scientist. Dr. Melvin Reuber, a National Cancer Center research scientist, found his career destroyed and reputation ruined after someone leaked a private employment reprimand letter to chemical industry officials, which was then published in Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News.
38
The personnel action and reprimand letter, which a jury found contained false statements, 39 occurred after someone with the California Department of Food and Agriculture complained to Reuber's supervisors that his research on the potential carcinogenicity of the pesticide malathion was harming the state's agriculture industry. 40 Former EPA scientist David Lewis alleges that EPA and sludge industry representatives retaliated against him for his research and publications challenging the safety of the land application of sewage sludge.
41 U.S. Department of Labor investigators agreed, finding that, in reaction to an article in Nature critical of EPA's sludge rule, agency officials applied ethics rules on the print size of publication disclaimers in a discriminatory fashion and unlawfully denied Lewis his promotion.
42
Other efforts to suppress Lewis's work included sludge industry representative attempts to have EPA withdraw financial support for Lewis's research, an EPA official's public distribution of sludge industry materials attacking Lewis's credibility, and an EPA official's solicitation of industry help in writing a negative internal peer review of Lewis's research. 43 In addition, a lead industry trade group hired dozens of scientists in an attempt to discredit the work of Herbert Needleman, a Harvard University scientist, whose research indicated that even low levels of exposure to lead could negatively impact a young child's intelligence and behavior. 44 Years after an EPA committee of experts examined Dr. Needleman's work and rejected lead industry complaints that he had committed scientific misconduct, two scientists, represented by a law firm that previously represented lead companies and acting on "suspicions," filed renewed scientific misconduct charges against Needleman. 45 He was again cleared of all misconduct charges but spent more than fifteen years and thousands of dollars, not to mention thousands of hours that would otherwise have been spent on further research on lead's toxicity, defending his work and character against unsupported scientific misconduct charges. 46 Further, a campaign allegedly orchestrated by a public relations company that worked for Monsanto attacked the character of researchers David Quist and Ignacio Chapela of the University of California at Berkeley. In 2001, Quist and Chapela published a study indicating that traces of DNA from bio-engineered corn had spread to native Mexican maize and, more controversially, that the foreign genes seemed to have become re-assorted and introduced into different genomic backgrounds. 47 Immediately upon publication, critics of the study mounted a series of Internet-based attacks, some false, against the researchers' motivations and credibility. 48 It turned out that many of the Internet postings were made using fictitious names from computers belonging to a public relations firm specializing in "Internet advocacy" that represents Monsanto, a leading manufacturer of genetically modified crops. 49 Chapela, who also was personally intimidated and threatened by Burd, supra note 45, at A27; Needleman, supra note 33, at 980. Needleman argues that his experience "shows that the federal investigative process can be rather easily exploited by commercial interests to cloud the regulatory consensus about a toxicant's dangers, can slow the regulatory pace, can damage an investigator's credibility, and can keep him tied up almost to the exclusion of any scientific output for long stretches of time, while defending himself." Id. 
50
A number of surveys have examined the scope of suppression of science. A 1991 survey of university-industry research centers found that universities had weakened their long-held commitment to the free flow of information and to full public disclosure of their research findings in order to obtain industry funding.
51
More than 40% of survey respondents reported that sharing information with the public is at times restricted; 35% reported that companies participating in university research can require that information be deleted from research papers prior to submission for publication; and more than half indicated that participating companies can delay the publication of research findings.
52
A 1993 survey of university life sciences faculty likewise found that 20% admitted to withholding research results for more than six months at least once in the previous three years. 53 Of that 20%, 28% delayed publication to slow the dissemination of undesired results and even greater numbers delayed to protect the proprietary or other financial value of the results. 54 Nine percent of life science faculty reported refusing to share research results or materials with other university scientists in the previous three years, and 34% indicated that they had been denied research produced by other university scientists.
55 After examining the context in which research was performed, the authors concluded that their findings confirmed the widespread impression that involvement with commercialization or participation in an academic-industry research relationship are significantly associated with the tendency of faculty to withhold research results.
56
A 1994 study of life sciences companies engaged in the fields of agriculture, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals confirmed this practice of withholding research GUARDIAN Blumenthal et al., supra note 53, at 1226. Forty-six percent reported delaying publication for more than six months to allow time for patent application; 33% reported delaying to protect the proprietary value of the research by means other than patent application. Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1227.
data.
57 Fifty-six percent stated that the research they support in universities often or sometimes results in keeping information confidential to protect its proprietary value beyond the time required to file a patent. 58 The authors of the study expressed concern that the information withheld by these companies may involve findings of interest to academic colleagues, including information useful in repeating and confirming research results.
59
A 1999 survey of British specialists in science, engineering, and technology found that 30% had been asked to tailor their research conclusions or resulting advice to suit the customer's preferred outcome, to obtain future contracts, or to discourage publication. 60 Results from a survey of attendees at the annual conference of the ISEE revealed that 50% of those who completed the questionnaire had experienced harassment following publication of research on health risks from environmental exposures.
61
In addition to delays or suppression of certain information, surveys indicate that many environmental scientists are reluctant to engage in certain research, or speak out on certain issues of environmental science, for fear of retribution. More than half of Australian environmental scientists employed as university researchers felt that scientists jeopardize their careers by speaking out on environmental issues; 62 over one-third knew scientists who had been disadvantaged because of their views on environmental issues. 63 An indication of the level of concern these scientists had for their careers if they disseminated unwelcome scientific information was the finding that, while over half had provided scientific information to politically-active environmental organizations, 16% acted exclusively in an anonymous capacity and an additional 43% acted anonymously at times. 64 A study of Cornell University agricultural and nutrition-science faculty and extension educators found that although almost half had environmental or public health reservations about genetically-engineered foods and crops, educators with such concerns were less comfortable in expressing their views with colleagues and other constituents than those with pro-genetically engineered food opinions. 65 The authors suggest that those with a precautionary viewpoint toward genetically engineered foods may not feel free to express their views openly, particularly where they are seeking tenure or reappointment, out of concern over antagonizing agribusiness interests within the university. Id. at 371. 59 Id. at 372. Because researchers often are reluctant to publicize their cases of suppression or stand up to employers or financial sponsors of research, there is no way of knowing how many studies have been delayed, suppressed, or altered due to outside influences on environmental research. 67 Martin argues it is reasonable to infer that the publicized cases of suppression are but a small fraction of the number of times third parties try to suppress environmental science. 68 Every researcher that has looked at the phenomenon has concluded that efforts to suppress environmental science are significant and increasing, 69 with one university researcher opining there was more pressure on environmental research from external sources than he had seen in thirty-eight years at the university.
70
Even if the number of publicized efforts to interfere in environmental research is limited, the effects may not be. Efforts to suppress an environmental scientist's work not only impact the person directly attacked but also others who, upon learning of the attack, are dissuaded from pursuing certain lines of inquiry or publishing certain results. 71 This self-censorship, often hard to document, may be the greatest source of suppression.
III. LAWS RELATING TO SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
The examples of suppression set out above suggest three areas of the law that may impact the scientific freedom of environmental scientists: defamation; scientific misconduct rules; and protection of employee speech.
A. DEFAMATION: SUPPRESSION'S SWORD OR SHIELD?
Special interests and scientists have repeatedly invoked the law of defamation, and even product disparagement, as means of both suppressing and protecting scientific speech. Efforts to use the law of defamation to suppress scientific speech are unlikely to succeed in court, given the protection afforded by the First Amendment to speech of public concern. Those same First Amendment protections Beeman, supra note 29 (reporting the opinion of economist Neil Harl of Iowa State University). 71 Martin, supra note 4, at 47. also make it difficult for a scientist to use the law against suppression efforts that defame the scientist.
To establish a case for defamation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false statement concerning the plaintiff to a third person that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
72 Businesses, like individuals, can be defamed if the false statement injures the business character of the corporation or its prestige and standing in the industry.
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In the case of defamation and other actions alleging injury from the written or spoken statements of environmental scientists, a number of First Amendment doctrines provide protection against such suits.
74 First, where the person allegedly defamed is a "public official" or "public figure," the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing proof that the defendant made the statement with actual malice. 75 A person can be a public figure where she has achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that she is a public figure for all purposes and contexts, 76 or where she voluntarily assumes a central role in a particular public controversy and becomes a public figure for that limited issue. Sullivan actual malice standard to cases involving product disparagement); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on defamation cases to determine a claim of product disparagement because "as a tort whose actionability depends on the existence of disparaging speech, the tort is substantially similar to defamation"); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Cal. 1986) (holding that First Amendment protection applies to all claims whose gravamen is the injurious falsehood of a statement).
75
Public officials include "those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) . "The employee's position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy." Id. at 86 n.13. "In close cases, courts have begun to emphasize the degree of policy-making authority wielded by the plaintiff in his or her official position, as well as the plaintiff's level of access to the media, as factors to be weighed in making the public official determination." SMOLLA, supra note 72, § 2:108. Id. The Court has stated that the media cannot "bootstrap" a person into a public figure by pointing to media coverage by the defendant of the plaintiff as evidence that the plaintiff is a public figure. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) . The public controversy that gives rise to public figure status must preexist the statement that gives rise to the defamation suit, not be created by the media itself. SMOLLA, supra note 72, § 2:25.
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. affecting the debate. 79 Scientists may become limited public figures if they testify before regulatory agencies or serve as expert witnesses on the subject at issue, 80 voluntarily participate in media coverage of the issue, 81 or publish an opinion piece for a newspaper on a controversial issue.
82
Two cases illustrate the distinction between a private figure and limited public figure scientist. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, a scientist sued a U.S. Senator for defamation after the Senator used the scientist's publicly-funded research as an example of what the Senator perceived to be wasteful government spending. 83 The Court found that, because the scientist had simply received federal research grants and published his research results in scholarly journals that only reach a small category of professionals, he had not invited the kind of attention and comment that merits limited public figure status. 84 In contrast, the court in Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc. found that the environmental scientist was a limited public figure and could only recover for the publication of false information about his conduct and character upon a showing of actual malice, because, in part, the scientist willingly shared a manuscript of his research with an environmental group and an attorney for a California county. 85 Regrettably, this case suggests that where an environmental scientist is aware of a controversy and knowingly supplies her research results to interested parties, as 79 The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals uses a five-part test to determine limited purpose public figure status: 1) plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; 2) plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy; 3) plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy; 4) the controversy existed prior to publication of the defamatory statements; and 5) plaintiff retained public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982 Id. at 134-35. "Neither his applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional journals can be said to have invited that degree of public attention and comment on his receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level." Id. at 135. Thus, publication of scientific research in journals, without more, should not make a scientist a limited public figure. See Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 993-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting that a scientist's journal articles were intended for a scholarly audience, not for a mass market).
The Court did not address whether the professor was a "public official" but did note that the category "cannot be though to include all public employees." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8; see Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299, 1304 (Miss. 1989) (holding that public university professor involved in geology research and grants was not in that class of higher level, decision-making public employees that are deemed public officials); see generally Brian Markovitz, Note, Public School Teachers as Plaintiffs in Defamation Suits: Do They Deserve Actual Malice?, 88 GEO. L. J. 1953, 1981-83 (2000) (noting the split in state courts on whether public school teachers are public officials but arguing that it is inappropriate to treat public school teachers as public officials). 85 Reuber, 925 F.2d at 709-10. opposed to having a third party find the results on its own in a scholarly journal, the scientist could be deemed a public figure in any later defamation action by the scientist against persons or publications that made false statements against the scientist. Public figure status may come simply by supplying research upon request to a public interest organization or government entity involved in a dispute.
If scientists can so easily be deemed to have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution, then limited public purpose status would also be appropriate for a business or special interest group seeking to convince the public of the safety or minimal environmental impacts of its products or activities. Indeed, many attacks on scientists are for the very purpose of influencing, or in many cases limiting, public debate on environmental controversies. Thus, environmental scientists can take some comfort that, in most instances, a business suing an environmental scientist for allegedly defamatory research would be deemed a limited public figure and have to prove actual malice by the scientist in making the allegedly defamatory statement. 86 If the individual or business seeking to sue the environmental scientist is a public figure, the requirement to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly defamatory statement was made with actual malice is difficult. Actual malice requires proof that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard to whether it was false or not. 87 Reckless disregard means that the speaker made the statement with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity or entertained serious doubts as to its truth. 88 Inaccuracies or errors are considered inevitable in debates and do not demonstrate malice. 89 It is also not enough to show that the defendant acted with spite, hatred, ill will, or intent to injure the plaintiff, or even that the statement was made to increase the speaker's profits. 90 Mere denials, however vehement, do not constitute clear and convincing proof of actual malice since denials are so common in heated debates that they do not sufficiently alert the speaker to the likelihood of error. 91 In essence, if a person or business sought to sue an environmental scientist over his or her research statements, the plaintiff would have to prove some intentional research misconduct, not simply research error or carelessness.
Even if the person or business allegedly defamed is not a public figure, where the issue involved in the defamatory statement is of "public concern," the plaintiff must show proof of fault by the defendant. 92 Whether a statement addresses a matter 86 See generally Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 590-91 (1st Cir. 1980) (using a three-part test to determine if a corporation is a limited purpose public figure: 1) whether the controversy giving rise to the defamation was a public, or merely private, matter; 2) whether the controversy pre-existed the defamatory statements at issue; and 3) the nature and extent of the plaintiff's participation in the controversy). When a corporation sues in defamation, a majority of courts apply the same public-private figure and public concern standards to determine the burden of proof to place on the business. See SMOLLA, supra note 72, § § This includes not only the number of persons affected by the subject of the allegedly defamatory statement but also the severity of the impact on those persons affected.
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Given the public's interest in issues of environmental science and the likely broad dissemination of the statement, as well as the likely impact of the statement on public health or the environment, an environmental scientist's research and opinions about issues of environmental science are likely to be considered statements of public concern and given enhanced First Amendment protection.
95
As a matter of public concern, the statement must be provable as false before there can be liability under defamation law. 96 Mere statements of opinion or those not shown to be false are not actionable. However, where a statement of "opinion" implies a false assertion of fact that is capable of being proven true or false, it loses its First Amendment protection. 97 Statements that are hyperbolic or exaggerated often are not taken reasonably to imply false facts.
98
Decisions in lawsuits against environmental scientists or against publishers for reporting the results of environmental research demonstrate the remoteness of proving research statements false, much less showing, in cases where the plaintiff is a public figure, that any provable false statements were made with actual malice. For example, in a lawsuit by apple growers against CBS television for broadcasting a news program on the carcinogenic risks of the pesticide Alar on children, the court required the plaintiffs to provide affirmative evidence that the pesticide does not pose a risk to children. 99 Because of the absence of specific studies on cancer risks to children from Alar and the difficulty of disproving a risk, plaintiffs were unable to show that statements made during the broadcast were false. 
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In Reuber, the court characterized the debate over the carcinogenic hazards of pesticide spraying as a "controversy of immense public concern," observing that the implications of scientific research are more far reaching today than ever before and noting the enhanced importance of the public's understanding of a scientist's credentials and conclusions. Reuber v. Food Chemical News, 925 F.2d 703, 718, 720 (4th Cir. 1991).
96
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 97 Id. at 20 (holding "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection"); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Even a statement cast in the form of an opinion ('I think that Judge X is dishonest') implies a factual basis, and the lack of support for that implied factual assertion may be a proper basis for a penalty."). 98 See, e.g., Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. v. Kaufman, 113 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1997) ("His figurative reference to 'poison' is hyperbolic, but exaggeration does not equal defamation.").
To be defamatory, the statement also must be "of or concerning" the plaintiff. Similarly, in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, a company sued the editor of a scientific journal for publishing an allegedly false letter to the editor. 101 The letter criticized a company's plan to conduct hepatitis research using wild chimpanzees over concerns that, because there was no scientific method to determine if the animals carried hepatitis, subsequent release of the chimpanzees might endanger wild populations. 102 In holding that the plaintiff failed to show the falsity of factual assertions in the letter, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a scientific test that could "conclusively" determine the carrier state in chimpanzees or "definitely" rule out that a veteran chimpanzee was not a carrier.
103
Many environmental science disputes are reducible to differences of opinion on the appropriate methodology, degree of uncertainty or likelihood of uncertain outcomes or causation, or involve scientific hypotheses or allegations of risk that cannot be proved or disproved. In addition, it is the nature of scientists to state their conclusions cautiously by characterizing their results as hypotheses and choosing words that suggest the tentative nature of the findings and conclusions.
104 Therefore, where an environmental scientist's research concerns an unresolved scientific issue or methodology or is expressed in cautionary fashion, proving false facts would be difficult.
The Reuber case, where the court of appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the allegedly defamed scientist, suggests that proving actual malice also would be difficult. 105 The court found that the publisher's decision not to inquire whether inconsistent statements in a government personnel letter were true or false and the publisher's admission that it would have published the allegedly defamatory statement even if it knew that some or all of it was false did not prove malice. 106 The court explained that it was "reject[ing] the attempt to silence one's adversaries in a public controversy by suing organizations attempting to inform the public about questions raised as to the research [of an environmental scientist]." 106 Id. at 716-17. The court noted that the fair report privilege, which shields news organizations from defamation claims when publishing information originally based on government reports or actions, "makes it more difficult for a reviewing court to conclude that a news report on government functions was published in reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 714; see also SMOLLA, supra note 72, § 4:100 (noting the increased acceptance of a "neutral reportage privilege" that protects the reporting of serious charges against a public figure or public official). 107 Reuber, 925 F.2d at 718. The Immuno AG. and Reuber cases support Professor Diane Zimmerman's argument that scientific speech should be afforded the same claim to constitutional protection as a daily newspaper:
Newspapers are protected not simply because they report about government, but because their entire range of reportage provides citizens with the tools necessary to inform their personal as well as their political views and decisions. This instrumental justification is equally applicable to scientific information. As the experience of the past half century shows, scientific information is profoundly While the likelihood of success in a defamation lawsuit based on scientific speech seems remote, the "threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit . . . may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself." 108 Any lawsuit that an environmental scientist must defend extracts a heavy toll in time and expenses. In the Immuno AG. case, although the editor of the Journal of Medical Primatology was ultimately vindicated by a unanimous court, the seven-year litigation cost $2 million in legal expenses, including $70,000 the editor had to pay out of his own pocket because his insurance company would not pay for certain necessary depositions. 109 The other defendants in the case, which included the person who wrote the letter to the editor, the New Scientist journal, and New York University, settled rather than endure the time and expense of a trial.
110
The threat of litigation, even where the likelihood of success by the plaintiff is doubtful, can even dissuade editors or publishing companies from publishing scientific research. When Dr. Stanton Glantz and four associates wrote a book analyzing secret tobacco industry documents on the health effects of smoking, publisher after publisher turned down the opportunity to publish the book. 111 As one publisher explained:
At serious big-league law firms, the consensus was that, although we could probably ultimately show that we have a right to publish, financially we'd be out of business before we had a chance to show anybody anything. If you anger a tobacco company and get into what amounts to a financial war with it-where the issue is who can afford better attorneys for longer-you're going to lose.
112
The court in Immuno AG. observed that the chilling effect of threatened litigation "can be especially severe for scholarly journals, such as defendants, whose editors will likely have more than a passing familiarity with the subject matter of the specialized materials they publish."
113 Professor Michael Curtis warns that "[t]he current pesticide dialogue is seriously distorted by threats of defamation actions which are insufficiently deterred by existing legal rules [on defamation]."
114 He argues that a scientist who believes that the safety of pesticides is little cause for concern is comparatively safe in making unequivocal and bland assurances of safety, while scientists who think pesticides in food expose the public to unreasonable risks must express themselves in a much more guarded fashion or face the possibility of important to members of the larger society. Even a piece of "technical" information accessible only to a specialized audience of physicists or chemists or microbiologists may nevertheless be a matter of public concern precisely because its applications have real consequences for the national community, requiring informed social choices. immediate legal action. 115 As discussed in Part IV, to ensure an open, fair debate on issues of environmental science in which both sides feel equally free to express their scientific positions, steps must be taken to minimize the ability of lawsuits and threats of lawsuits to suppress environmental science.
B. MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT CHARGES
Misconduct in scientific research is a source of increasing attention and regulation. Spurred by Congressional concerns, 116 over the past decade federal agencies have developed extensive regulations that both define misconduct in federal research and set forth processes for responding to misconduct allegations and punishing those found guilty of misconduct.
117 Along with this focus have come calls for the right and responsibility of those with information about misconduct to report such activity 118 and increased efforts to protect those who do report suspected misconduct against possible retaliation.
119 Federal regulations require institutions that receive research grants to develop policies and procedures to protect whistleblowers who make good faith allegations of scientific misconduct.
120
This focus on identifying and punishing misconduct, and encouraging the reporting of suspected misconduct, has created a potential weapon against unwelcome environmental research-the unsupported allegation of research 115 Id. "As the rules play out, certain viewpoints are favored over others. . . . Indeed, by permitting long and expensive proceedings--whatever the outcome--the law deters one viewpoint while promoting another." Id. misconduct. 121 In the past, a concern about scientific research might have resulted in a request for reanalysis or correction that was handled informally or in an article in a scientific journal challenging the earlier result. Today, misconduct allegations trigger a formalized process with, in a majority of cases, adverse consequences even for those exonerated of such charges.
Without doubt, an allegation of research misconduct can interfere with the ability of an environmental scientist to perform and distribute research. Herbert Needleman learned this after spending more than ten years of his life and thousands of dollars rebutting unsubstantiated charges of misconduct in his research on the effects of exposure to lead. 122 Two scientists who filed the charges, represented by a law firm that previously represented lead companies, admitted they had no evidence of any misconduct, only "suspicions." 123 Dr. Eugene Dong, a teacher and researcher at Stanford University, forwarded a graduate student's concerns about scientific conclusions in a colleague's research to the chairman of the department. 124 Upset with Dong for passing on the information, the accused scientist, in turn, wrote letters to the university accusing Dong of scientific fraud.
125 Dong's accuser later admitted under oath that he did not have any evidence to support the misconduct charges.
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Various interested parties attacked University of Washington researchers after they published a study casting doubt on the value of immunodiagnostic tests used to support claims for chemical sensitivity. 127 Allegedly, some of the accusers contacted patients of one of the researchers to encourage them to attack the researcher's 121 Professor Ellen Silbergeld explained the lead industry's efforts to silence Dr. Herbert Needleman:
In the 1990s a new weapon was at hand. S157-58 (1996) . 123 Needleman, supra note 33, at 979-80. One of the accusers admitted that the accusers' legal fees were paid through a trust fund but declined to identify the source of funds, saying she had been asked to keep the matter confidential. Burd, supra note 45, at A30. Silbergeld characterizes this particular abuse of the scientific misconduct investigative process as intended to "hobble a highly accomplished researcher and terrorize those who might be inspired to emulate him." Silbergeld, supra note 121, at 165. 124 credibility.
128
Even after five separate inquiries found no basis for a full-scale inquiry, the accusers continued to file complaints and publicly accuse the exonerated researchers of misconduct.
129
A number of commentators have cautioned about the abuse of charges of scientific misconduct. Professor Dan Burk observed that the present investigative process allows charges of misconduct easily to be brought out of spite, professional jealousy or revenge, or to punish or remove unpopular or irksome researchers.
130
Professor Harold Green argues that "most whistle-blowers' allegations will ultimately prove baseless and motivated by animosity, personal grievances, personality problems, and the like." 131 The Director of the National Center for Environmental Health and a member of the federal Commission on Research Integrity expressed alarm that companies are using alleged concerns about research integrity to intimidate public health scientists and further commercial ends. 132 A report that an attorney sponsored a workshop promoting the use of allegations of scientific misconduct as a way to attack unwelcome research supports concerns that allegations of misconduct are being abused by individuals or groups motivated by special interests.
133
Even if the misconduct allegation results in exoneration, the accused usually suffers. A 1996 report for the Public Health Service's Office of Research Integrity ("ORI") found that 60% of exonerated scientists experienced at least one adverse consequence as a result of being accused of scientific misconduct. 134 Ninety percent of those who suffered negative consequences indicated that the negative actions began during the misconduct inquiry or investigation, and 65% reported that these negative actions continued even after they were exonerated. 135 In addition to the In a number of ways, federal scientific misconduct whistleblower protection rules may condone unfounded misconduct allegations against environmental scientists. First, the rules do not require a complainant to provide any threshold of information to support the allegation, and institutions are expected to conduct an immediate inquiry whenever any misconduct is alleged, regardless of evidentiary basis or motivation.
138
Federal regulations do require that the initial inquiry triggered by an allegation must determine that the allegation has "substance" or a "sufficient basis" before moving to the more formal investigation stage. 139 There is neither any requirement in the regulations, however, that an accuser provide information in the initial allegation that triggers an inquiry nor any elaboration on the detail necessary to move to the investigation stage. An ORI survey of research institution policies for responding to allegations of scientific misconduct found that only 11% of institutions expect the complainant to describe the misconduct, and only 10% expect supporting documentation or other evidence. 140 Apparently, allegations sufficient to trigger a misconduct investigation at most institutions include mere suspicion. 141 Second, ORI argues that, provided the accuser makes the allegation in good faith, a whistleblower is entitled to a conditional privilege against defamation claims.
142 ORI defines good faith as either a subjective belief in the truth of one's own allegation or what a reasonable person could have believed based upon the information known to the whistleblower at the time of the allegation.
143 Nisan Steinberg argues that ORI's privilege policy seeks to provide greater protection to misconduct whistleblowers than generally provided by the common law. 144 He notes the common law privilege for reporting wrongdoing to public authorities requires that the accuser act in a reasonable manner for a proper purpose and forfeits the privilege if the accuser acts chiefly from motives of ill will. 145 ORI's broad privilege policy, by requiring a showing of actual malice before the privilege is lost, would extend protection even to accusers who have an unreasonable belief in the truth of the allegation or act primarily out of ill will, spite, or a desire to do harm to the accused scientist. As noted in Part III.A, actual malice is difficult to prove in court. 146 Finally, the misconduct rules do not attempt to punish unfounded or bad faith accusers, other than to waive their immunity from defamation lawsuits. The Office of Science Technology, in response to a comment on its draft research misconduct policy, refused to include a provision punishing informants who act in bad faith, explaining that non-federal research institutions could adopt policies to address the consequences of false, malicious, or capricious allegations, and agencies could address the issue in the implementation of their misconduct policies. 147 However, only 3% of institutional policies specify the disciplinary actions that will be taken against persons who make bad faith allegations of scientific misconduct. . 145 Id. at 102 n.377. "[I]t appears that the [common law] privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection. If the [accuser] acts chiefly from motives of ill will, he will certainly be liable. . . . [The privilege may also be lost if the accuser does not act] "as a reasonable person under the circumstances, with due regard to the strength of his belief, the ground that he has to support it, and the importance of conveying the information." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 73, at 834-35. 146 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 147 MISCONDUCT (Feb. 1997) , available at http://ori.dhhs.gov/multimedia/ acrobat/mod_pol.pdf. Instead, the Model Policy simply states that the institutional official who makes the final determination on allegations of scientific misconduct will determine whether any administrative action should be taken against the bad faith whistleblower. Id. at 18. sanctions against those who file unfounded allegations. 149 Similarly, in the cases of unfounded accusations noted above, there is no report of any disciplinary or other adverse action taken against the accusers for making unfounded allegations. 150 Thus, unless an exonerated scientist chooses to sue the accuser for defamation or some other infringement of the scientist's rights, the accuser may not face any sanction for filing an unfounded misconduct charge.
The National Academy of Sciences's 1992 report on scientific misconduct noted the problems caused by false accusations and included malicious allegations of misconduct as a form of scientific misconduct. 151 The report argued that, given the damage that can be done by false or malicious allegations and the time and resources necessary to investigate allegations, "appropriate documentation" should be provided at the time of an initial allegation to justify reviewing the complaint.
152
Members of the Commission on Research Integrity likewise expressed concern about whether allegations of misconduct have been and can be misused for commercial ends and asserted that their report would investigate this issue. 153 However, the Commission's 1995 report, although it identified obstruction of investigations of research misconduct as a form of scientific misconduct and repeatedly expressed concern over the treatment of whistleblowers, did not identify unfounded or malicious allegations as a form of misconduct. 154 The Department of Health and Human Service's ("HHS") implementation group expressed concern that the Commission's report appeared more attentive to the rights of whistleblowers and the responsibilities of other parties than to the responsibilities of whistleblowers and the rights of other parties, such as the accused. 155 In addition, fifty professional societies representing scientific researchers criticized the Commission on Research Integrity's report for ignoring the possibility that accusations may be ill-founded, malevolent, or simply wrong, and for failing to appreciate the damaging consequences innocent scientists face because of such accusations. 156 The scientists objected to the report's lack of recommendations to address wrongful behavior on the part of the accuser and to its protection of complainants at the expense of accused scientists. In spite of these objections, HHS's proposed regulation on scientific misconduct whistleblowers does not include a provision on bad faith allegations. 158 As proposed in Part IV, federal agencies and research institutions must do more to guard against the harm resulting from unfounded allegations of research misconduct.
C. COUNTERING EMPLOYER RETALIATION
A common form of suppression is for an employer to take some punitive personnel action against the scientist who has undertaken, or intends to undertake, unwelcome research. These actions include discharges, denials of promotions, raises, or other employment benefits, transfers, and creating hostile working conditions, all intended to either suppress the scientist's work or discourage the scientist from continuing the area of research.
In some circumstances, whistleblower protection statutes and the First Amendment may provide a remedy to counter these suppression efforts.
The federal Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 159 as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 160 recognizes that disclosure of waste, fraud, and abuse is in the public interest and protects whistleblowers from reprisal. 161 The Act makes it illegal to retaliate against any federal employee for lawfully disclosing information that evidences illegality, gross mismanagement or waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 162 For protection under the Act, a federal employee must show that the employee made a disclosure evidencing a reasonable belief of illegality or misconduct and that the disclosure was a contributing factor in an adverse personnel action that was taken or is to be taken against the employee.
163 Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the federal employer to demonstrate, through clear and convincing evidence, that the agency would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the disclosure. 164 For a disclosure of public health or safety to be protected, it must be both substantial and specific. As a Senate report explained:
[G]eneral criticism by an employee of the Environmental Protection Agency that the agency is not doing enough to protect the environment would not be protected under [the Whistleblower Protection Act]. However, an allegation by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer that the cooling system of a nuclear reactor is inadequate would fall within the whistleblower protections. 167 Employee protection provisions in federal environmental statutes may be more useful to scientists. A number of federal environmental statutes protect employees who disclose violations of environmental laws or assist in a proceeding resulting from the administration of the statute. 168 An employer violates these whistleblower provisions if the employee engaged in a protected activity of which the employer was aware, the employer discharged or otherwise discriminated against the employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. 169 Aggrieved employees are entitled to affirmative relief to abate the discrimination, including reinstatement, back pay, and, if appropriate, compensatory damages.
170
Unlike the Whistleblower Protection Act, these environmental whistleblower provisions prohibit retaliation against any category of employee, not just federal employees. 171 Similarly, thirty-nine states have whistleblower statutes that provide general whistleblower protection to public employees, twenty-three states provide general protection for all employees, and fourteen states provide specific protection to persons reporting certain environmental misconduct. 172 The availability of federal environmental whistleblower protection statutes and their effectiveness in addressing efforts to punish a scientist depend in large measure on the nature of the scientist's work. Whistleblower provisions in federal environmental statutes "share a broad, remedial purpose of protecting workers from retaliation based on their concerns for safety and quality." 173 Engaging in unpopular research alone would not constitute an activity protected by whistleblower statutes. To be protected, most statutes require that the employee commence, seek to commence, or participate in some type of proceeding for the administration or enforcement of requirements in an environmental statute. 174 Thus, with the exception of the Superfund statute, 175 a scientist seeking the protection of an environmental whistleblower statute would have to show that the research work triggering the personnel action was "grounded in conditions reasonably perceived to be violations of the environmental acts" or for use in administering the acts, not simply that the research work indicated the environment might be negatively impacted by certain conduct. 176 Even if the scientist engages in work relating to the administration or enforcement of a federal environmental law, environmental whistleblower protection only applies if the scientist in some way disseminates her concerns. Internal complaints to the employer or to a co-worker are a protected activity, 177 as are complaints to the news media and public interest groups. 178 Sharing information with an environmental activist also may constitute a protected activity, although merely discussing a problem with a member of the general public may be too remote. 179 No formal or written complaint is required, nor must the information provided be unique or of a type that the employer is attempting to hide. 180 In some circumstances, disclosure of scientific research might constitute a protected activity. EPA toxicologist William Marcus successfully used federal environmental whistleblower provisions when he was terminated by the agency after drafting and releasing a memo criticizing a report EPA contemplated using in regulating fluoride levels.
181 When, after his reinstatement, EPA "bad-mouthed"
him with respect to job references and his potential as an expert witness and isolated him from his fellow employees and peers, Marcus again successfully used federal whistleblower provisions to recover an additional $100,000 in compensatory damages from EPA. 182 EPA microbiologist David Lewis collected $115,000 from EPA when agency administrators accused him of an ethics violation for publishing a 1996 article in Nature alleging that EPA was bypassing sound science due to political pressures. 183 The Department of Labor found that the agency's inquiry into Lewis's compliance with agency standards was improperly motivated by the content of his writings rather than a sincere concern about the form or style of the writings.
184 EPA scientist Kate Jenkins won reinstatement to her previous position and $10,000 after she was punished by EPA for releasing information that questioned the scientific validity of an industry study on dioxin. 185 Similarly, an engineer's concern that studies relied on by his company to obtain federal water pollution discharge permits were flawed demonstrates a sufficiently perceived violation of the federal Clean Water Act to constitute a protected whistleblower activity.
186 "Protected activity" also includes the issuance of a report finding excessive concentrations of hazardous substances on school property. 187 In contrast, research advocating a new methodology to measure harm from certain wastes is not a protected activity since the work does not allege a violation of any environmental statute. 188 Thus, where a scientist's research publications and speeches indicate the government or some other entity is not complying with requirements in environmental statutes, or are for use in agency proceedings, employee protection provisions in environmental statutes should protect the scientist against employer reprisals. On the other hand, where the scientist is simply seeking to determine if a material or activity might harm the environment, and is not collecting or reporting evidence of a violation of environmental laws or information deemed to have "assisted or participated" in a proceeding to carry out the Safe Drinking Water Act and "provided information" that contributed to the identification of hazardous substances under Superfund. Id. at 5. 182 The First Amendment also may provide protection when an employer seeks to retaliate against an environmental scientist. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that the First Amendment protects government employees who speak on matters of public concern. 190 Even if a public employee could have been discharged for any reason or no reason at all, the employee may be entitled to protection if discharged for exercising a constitutional right to freedom of expression. 191 To prevail, a public employee must demonstrate that the speech may be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern" 192 and that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment action. 193 Courts look to the content, form, and context of a statement to determine if a public employee's speech pertains to a matter of public concern.
194 Speech fairly characterized as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community is deemed of public concern.
195 Speech characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy or workplace conditions is not. 196 Speeches and articles addressed to public audiences, made outside the workplace, and involving content largely unrelated to employment would more likely fall within the protected category of comment on matters of public concern. 197 Speech communicated only within the office or to a supervisor, rather than to the public at large, may still be a statement addressing a matter of public concern.
198 Because issues of public health, safety, or the environment so clearly touch on matters of concern to the public, statements by environmental scientists, whether in the form of writings or speeches, should be regarded as relating to matters of public concern.
199 If the court determines that a government employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court must then balance the interest of the employee in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of the government in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees to determine the scope of the First Amendment protection afforded. 200 This requires weighing the employee's interest in self-expression and participation in public discussions, along with the public's interest in being informed, against the government's interest in providing efficient services. 201 Among the relevant considerations are whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the speaker's duties, or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. 202 As the public concern element of the speech increases, so does the need for the government to show that the employee's speech disrupts the efficient operation of the government agency. 203 The public's strong interest in hearing from government scientists on matters of public health and safety further increases the burden on the government to show that the potential disruptiveness of the speech outweighs its value. 204 In addition, where an existing law or policy limits or chills the government employee's potential speech before it happens, the burden on the government is greater than in the case of an isolated disciplinary action against an employee.
Because rights secured by the Constitution only are protected against infringement by governments and public officials, 206 generally only scientists employed by government agencies may seek First Amendment protection against employers who seek to punish the scientist for speeches or publications on matters of public concern. Actions taken by non-governmental entities may be subject to First Amendment restrictions only if the alleged infringement of federal rights is "fairly attributable to the State." 207 Yet, "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice in law be deemed to be that of the State." 208 In the case of university researchers, even where virtually all of a school's income comes from government funding, such financial dependence does not make the school a state actor. 209 Likewise, scientists employed by government contractors, even where those employers receive most or all of their funding from government sources, should not expect protection from the First Amendment for discharges in retaliation for public speeches or publications on environmental matters. 210 Nonetheless, efforts by government officials to pressure a private employer to punish a scientist for her public speeches or publications on environmental issues could subject the government officials to claims that they unlawfully retaliated against the scientist for exercising her right to free speech. 211 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The widespread scope of suppression of environmental science, the significant harm that could result to public health or the environment from such suppression, and the limited usefulness of legal remedies for the protection of scientists support the need for enhanced efforts to discourage suppression and to defend scientists whose work is attacked. On the issue of defamation, courts should be wary of declaring that by going outside the laboratory or publishing outside of academic journals environmental scientists "assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions" or "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." 212 Findings by courts that the distribution of research challenging government scientific conclusions to a public interest organization and submission of a letter to the editor make scientists limited public figures for defamation purposes ignore the requirement that the role assumed be of "special prominence" to the controversy and that the person thrust herself to the "forefront" of a public debate. 213 Sharing scientific information or opinions, even where done voluntarily by the scientist, does not mean the scientist assumed special prominence in the debate or is at the forefront of the controversy. By punishing even marginal participation in a controversy, these broad interpretations of the limited public figure criteria chill public participation by knowledgeable scientists, especially since scientists are aware that a tactic now used to silence them is unfounded defamation lawsuits. 214 If, as courts have acknowledged, the public has an interest in hearing from scientists in environmental debates, then scientists should not, in effect, become fair game for ruthless attacks on their reputation and character simply by discussing or distributing their work. 215 Where scientists are subject to legal attack based on their work, their employers should step forward to defend and indemnify them. Defamation lawsuits against scientists rarely have merit, yet can extract a heavy toll on the scientist in terms of lost research time, money, and emotional distress. In many respects, these lawsuits resemble the "strategic lawsuits against public participation," or "SLAPPs", used by developers, businesses, and other special interests to chill or punish public participation. 216 According to experts, a SLAPP suit is best defended by early review and dismissal by courts and by "SLAPPing back" through monetary awards of attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and countersuit damages in favor of the defendant for the abuse of the courts and violation of constitutional rights caused by the SLAPP plaintiff.
To SLAPP back effectively and otherwise defend against legal attacks, scientists need the assistance of legal counsel. Institutions, however, often have failed to provide legal assistance to scientists targeted for attack. 218 State statutes generally provide for legal representation and indemnification of public employees for civil claims arising out of any act or omission occurring within the scope of their employment. 219 These employee protection provisions should be liberally construed to cover a government scientist's publications and speeches. In the case of university scientists, the American Association of University Professors recommends that colleges and universities adopt policies that ensure effective legal and other representation and full indemnification for any faculty member included in a lawsuit or other extra-institutional proceeding arising from an act or omission in the discharge of institutional or related professional duties, or in the defense of academic freedom at the institution. 220 This coverage should extend to occasions when the researcher is disseminating her work outside the academic setting, since universities offer their faculties' expertise for use by the media and use media coverage of faculty publications and speeches in university public relations efforts. 221 Research institutions should also recognize the important role attorneys play in defending scientists wrongly accused of scientific misconduct and should provide legal counsel to employees accused of scientific misconduct while performing their work in good faith. 222 Regarding allegations of scientific misconduct, statistics indicate that few allegations of misconduct turn out to be valid. 223 Hence, rules for investigating misconduct charges should reflect the small percentage of allegations found to be valid and the significant negative consequences scientists suffer even when exonerated. At a minimum, before any inquiry is initiated, the accuser should be required to provide evidence in support of the charge. 224 A mere allegation, suspicion, or hearsay information should not be considered sufficient to trigger an inquiry.
Although some institutional policies on reporting misconduct specify what evidence the accuser should provide, federal regulations do not require any evidence from the accuser. 225 For example, at the University of Arizona an accuser "should submit a detailed, written report" of the alleged misconduct; only "allegations reasonably evidencing misconduct" can trigger an inquiry. 226 The University of South Alabama likewise requires "evidence of wrongdoing" and notes that hearsay evidence alone is not adequate to warrant an inquiry. 227 Under the University of Massachusetts' policy, no inquiry may be initiated unless the allegation provides "sufficient evidence to warrant an inquiry." 228 Federal misconduct regulations should not simply allow institutions to require this type of objective evidence of misconduct in the allegation but should mandate such evidence before any institution initiates an inquiry.
In addition, federal regulations should require that the accuser have an objective basis for making a scientific misconduct allegation in order to enjoy protection from any defamation lawsuit by the accused. ORI argues that a whistleblower should be entitled to a conditional privilege to report allegations of misconduct if the whistleblower acted in "good faith."
229 ORI contends the privilege is lost only where the whistleblower acts with "bad faith" or "malice," defined as a situation where the whistleblower knows the statement is false or acts with reckless disregard for the truth. 230 Nisan Steinberg argues, "ORI's current policy appears to extend the protection of qualified privilege by ignoring the common law's concern that a qualified privilege must be exercised in a reasonable manner for a proper purpose, or it will be forfeited." 231 He notes that at common law, but not under ORI's policy, the privilege is forfeited if the accuser acts chiefly from motives of ill will. defamatory matter upon an occasion giving rise to a privilege, if made solely from spite or ill will, is an abuse and not a use of the privilege." 233 Thus, as Steinberg argues and the Restatement supports, whistleblowers should be expected to act with reasonable care in making allegations of misconduct and should not enjoy immunity from liability where they act out of malice toward the accused environmental scientist. 234 Whistleblowers who act in bad faith also should be punished as if they committed scientific misconduct. Present misconduct regulations do not include bad faith allegations in the definition of misconduct, nor do they require research entities to develop policies for punishing bad faith whistleblowers. 235 Although 65% of nonfederal institutional policies warn against making bad faith allegations of misconduct, only 3% specify the disciplinary actions that will be taken against persons who make unfounded allegations. 236 A review of HHS and National Science Foundation misconduct policies found no statement on punishment of bad faith whistleblowers other than the loss of the conditional privilege in any defamation action. 237 In the absence of a realistic threat of disciplinary action, the distant loss of the conditional privilege defense in a defamation action may not be sufficient to deter bad faith allegations of scientific misconduct.
Efforts to counter retaliation for scientific environmental speech would also be strengthened by expanding the coverage of statutory employee protection provisions. Although at least eight federal environmental statutes contain employee protection provisions, 238 the absence of these provisions in federal natural resource statutes leaves resource scientists with the largely ineffective Whistleblower Protection Act to rely on for relief. This absence of whistleblower protection provisions in most natural resource laws and the increasingly political nature of many natural resource decisions make natural resource scientists particularly vulnerable to retaliation for unwelcome research. these provisions "were passed in order to help enforce U.S. environmental laws, enhance environmental quality, and protect public health and safety." 248 Accordingly, agencies and courts should interpret employee protection provisions broadly to protect environmental scientists whenever employers seek to retaliate for work that may aid in administering or enforcing a federal environmental statute, even where that work is simply research that may assist the agency in administering the law or indicates the agency is not following a statutory requirement. 249 V. CONCLUSION Improved legal remedies clearly are needed to protect environmental scientists against suppression of their work, but legal remedies alone may not be sufficient to discourage and defend against such suppression. Colleagues and professional societies can and must do much more to oppose suppression. Few professional standards specifically address the practice of harassment of scientists. 250 Moreover, in some of the well-publicized cases of suppression, scientific and medical societies did not publicly support the scientists under attack. 251 Professional societies should make clear that efforts to suppress research by attacking scientists is unacceptable and should defend scientists under attack. 252 Society members should be discouraged from participating or assisting in such attacks and expected to lend support to colleagues who come under attack. Those who fail to abide by such standards should be censured and have their memberships suspended or revoked. 253 Likewise, institutions employing environmental scientists should enhance their efforts to support scientists who are attacked because of their work. Eager for corporate money, these institutions have too often failed to support their researchers when attacked. 254 For it is only when the scientist under attack, colleagues, professional societies, and research institutions, working with improved legal remedies, all join together that suppression of environmental science will be curtailed.
